The war in the Middle East

Since October 7th, the world’s gaze has shifted to a new focus point and below I will convey some observations that add value without engaging unconstructively in the quagmire of this ancient and deeply infected conflict.

I spend a lot of time observing world events and this conflict sticks out as worrisome.

The differing narratives are being pushed unusually hard and the actors doing so are combined constituted of unusually powerful actors with an unusually clear demarcation line. The distance between different rights and wrongs is miles apart.

Several actors with real geopolitical power all want a lasting resolution to this conflict. Their preferred route of getting there and end goal differ vastly, even among allies.

There are now two American carrier strike groups in the Eastern Mediterranean. The projection of power that a military force like this amounts to is considerable and only one nation in the world has the ability to do so with a global reach. In the Taiwan Strait crisis of 95-96 a similar force made China bitterly stand down. The point here being that in an unleashed military conflict the power balance would be clear, the ultimate victor certain and deterrence established.

The current conflict however started with a militarily weaker party attacking a superior enemy knowing that they, within the rules of modern warfare and with the asymmetrical advantages they in certain respects hold, could reach objectives if their tolerance for sacrifice were high enough. Hamas's holding of a large number of hostages is another impactful factor that leaves Israel with impossible choices and the potential to emotionally rip the nation apart.

In a broader perspective, the larger danger of this conflict lies in the risk of a wider escalation. Yesterday I watched Hassan Nasrallah’s November 3rd speech. It has in the media been described in different ways, largely as a de-escalatory one. Nasrallah states that the Hamas attack was not known in advance to any other part of “the axis of resistance” and he clearly states that it was a 100% Palestinian action. This has been described by many as a distancing between Hezbollah and Hamas.

He also clearly states that the decision to attack was made by the Hamas leadership alone and that every entity of the “axis of resistance” independently decides what actions different factions take. This also, of course, extends to Hezbollah. Iran has, over time, built up a network of proxies in the region to forcefully and with deniability project power in the region. It lies in their strategic interest to have different proxies compartmentalized to enable a flexible climb up and down the escalation ladder.

When Hassan Nasrallah states that any actions taken by Hamas is their and theirs alone, he also implicitly states that any action taken by Hezbollah is theirs and theirs alone, independently of Iran.

An action taken by Hamas can not fulfill the rules of engagement to attack Hezbollah and a widening of the conflict towards Hezbollah can not fulfill the rules of engagement towards Iran.

Israel views this conflict as existential and they worry that the deterrence that has kept them safe for decades will fade. Hamas is willing to pay almost any price to break their current situation. The US is trapped between standing by its most valued ally, defending the Middle East narrative contra the Ukrainian one and upkeeping their hold on global governance.

The risk of this conflict widening is real. So is the risk of other actors taking advantage of the situation.

We are at this point in a global media shadow that only historically comes a few times every decade. Everyone will push. A lot will happen. Much will go under the radar.

China and Russia are watching closely. From a harsh global strategic perspective, they are not having a bad day.

Update 2023-11-09

My overall ambition is to keep these posts accessible by writing densely (this also serves a few other purposes). I am however adding an important point from my underlying assessment that was not included in the original post’s text.

Iran assesses that Israel no longer has the capability to decisively strike their nuclear program without a large-scale military conflict involving direct significant participation by the US, including ground forces.

This in some ways changes the equation regarding different conflict thresholds, for example in regard to Hezbollah.

Update 2024-10-27

With the Hezbollah leadership decapitated, the organization’s strength and ability to resist Israel’s incursion have been put into question. Strategically the organization will have to reconstitute to remain the primary proxy threat to Israel. The organization tactically, as it has been constructed, however still holds the capability to inflict losses that will, in the long term, take a significant toll. The tactics used in Gaza can not be applied to Lebanon and this limits the options available.

Israel is now in an admitted three-front conflict. Internal political dynamics where different actors have vastly different objectives are converging. Netanyahu’s options, in the framework created around him, make the situation explosive. Different internal visions are colliding and certain actors see the opportunity of a lifetime.

The media shadow the conflict creates could now create opportunities for Israel to forward their positions regarding the fronts of the conflict not actively watched.

There have been plans. There are plans. They are still being implemented. The question is whose plan wins out in the end?

Expect Israel to territorially be larger than before this conflict began.

Update 2026-08-20: Corrected grammar and spelling (going through old posts using a new tool). The content of the text was not changed in any way.